Paper List
-
MCP-AI: Protocol-Driven Intelligence Framework for Autonomous Reasoning in Healthcare
This paper addresses the critical gap in healthcare AI systems that lack contextual reasoning, long-term state management, and verifiable workflows by...
-
Model Gateway: Model Management Platform for Model-Driven Drug Discovery
This paper addresses the critical bottleneck of fragmented, ad-hoc model management in pharmaceutical research by providing a centralized, scalable ML...
-
Tree Thinking in the Genomic Era: Unifying Models Across Cells, Populations, and Species
This paper addresses the fragmentation of tree-based inference methods across biological scales by identifying shared algorithmic principles and stati...
-
SSDLabeler: Realistic semi-synthetic data generation for multi-label artifact classification in EEG
This paper addresses the core challenge of training robust multi-label EEG artifact classifiers by overcoming the scarcity and limited diversity of ma...
-
Decoding Selective Auditory Attention to Musical Elements in Ecologically Valid Music Listening
This paper addresses the core challenge of objectively quantifying listeners' selective attention to specific musical components (e.g., vocals, drums,...
-
Physics-Guided Surrogate Modeling for Machine Learning–Driven DLD Design Optimization
This paper addresses the core bottleneck of translating microfluidic DLD devices from research prototypes to clinical applications by replacing weeks-...
-
Mechanistic Interpretability of Antibody Language Models Using SAEs
This work addresses the core challenge of achieving both interpretability and controllable generation in domain-specific protein language models, spec...
-
Fluctuating Environments Favor Extreme Dormancy Strategies and Penalize Intermediate Ones
This paper addresses the core challenge of determining how organisms should tune dormancy duration to match the temporal autocorrelation of their envi...
Social Distancing Equilibria in Games under Conventional SI Dynamics
Department of Mathematics, Pennsylvania State University | Huck Institute of Life Sciences, Pennsylvania State University
30秒速读
IN SHORT: This paper solves the core problem of proving the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in finite-duration SI epidemic games, showing they are always bang-bang strategies.
核心创新
- Methodology Introduces a novel change of variables that simplifies the geometry and analysis of the SI social-distancing game, enabling explicit integration and closed-form solutions.
- Theory Proves that for the specified SI game with threshold-linear costs, the unique strategic equilibrium is always a time-dependent bang-bang strategy (wait-then-lockdown), with no singular solutions.
- Theory Demonstrates that in the restricted strategy space of two-phase (off-on) strategies, the bang-bang Nash equilibrium is also an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS), and that it coincides with the socially optimal policy, eliminating free-riding.
主要结论
- For all parameter tuples (m, I0, tf), there exists one and only one equilibrium point x* (Theorem 10), proving uniqueness in the SI game.
- The equilibrium strategy is explicitly given by x*(m, I0, tf) = m - 1 - W((1/I0 - 1)e^{m-1-tf}) for intermediate parameters, utilizing the Lambert W function (Eq. 13).
- The optimal public policy (minimizing population disutility ℰ(x̄)) exactly corresponds with the individual Nash equilibrium strategy (Eq. 18), showing no conflict between individual and social optima in this model.
摘要: The mathematical characterization of social-distancing games in classical epidemic theory remains an important question, for their applications to both infectious-disease theory and memetic theory. We consider a special case of the dynamic finite-duration SI social-distancing game where payoffs are accounted using Markov decision theory with zero-discounting, while distancing is constrained by threshold-linear running-costs, and the running-cost of perfect-distancing is finite. In this special case, we are able construct strategic equilibria satisfying the Nash best-response condition explicitly by integration. Our constructions are obtained using a new change of variables which simplifies the geometry and analysis. As it turns out, there are no singular solutions, and a time-dependent bang-bang strategy consisting of a wait-and-see phase followed by a lock-down phase is always the unique strategic equilibrium. We also show that in a restricted strategy space the bang-bang Nash equilibrium is an ESS, and that the optimal public policy exactly corresponds with the equilibrium strategy.