Paper List
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Evolutionarily Stable Stackelberg Equilibrium
通过要求追随者策略对突变入侵具有鲁棒性，弥合了斯塔克尔伯格领导力模型与演化稳定性之间的鸿沟。
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Recovering Sparse Neural Connectivity from Partial Measurements: A Covariance-Based Approach with Granger-Causality Refinement
通过跨多个实验会话累积协方差统计，实现从部分记录到完整神经连接性的重建。
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Atomic Trajectory Modeling with State Space Models for Biomolecular Dynamics
ATMOS通过提供一个基于SSM的高效框架，用于生物分子的原子级轨迹生成，弥合了计算昂贵的MD模拟与时间受限的深度生成模型之间的差距。
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Slow evolution towards generalism in a model of variable dietary range
通过证明是种群统计噪声（而非确定性动力学）驱动了模式形成和泛化食性的演化，解决了间接竞争下物种形成的悖论。
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Grounded Multimodal Retrieval-Augmented Drafting of Radiology Impressions Using Case-Based Similarity Search
通过将印象草稿基于检索到的历史病例，并采用明确引用和基于置信度的拒绝机制，解决放射学报告生成中的幻觉问题。
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Unified Policy–Value Decomposition for Rapid Adaptation
通过双线性分解在策略和价值函数之间共享低维目标嵌入，实现对新颖任务的零样本适应。
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Mathematical Modeling of Cancer–Bacterial Therapy: Analysis and Numerical Simulation via Physics-Informed Neural Networks
提供了一个严格的、无网格的PINN框架，用于模拟和分析细菌癌症疗法中复杂的、空间异质的相互作用。
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Sample-Efficient Adaptation of Drug-Response Models to Patient Tumors under Strong Biological Domain Shift
通过从无标记分子谱中学习可迁移表征，利用最少的临床数据实现患者药物反应的有效预测。
Social Distancing Equilibria in Games under Conventional SI Dynamics
Department of Mathematics, Pennsylvania State University | Huck Institute of Life Sciences, Pennsylvania State University
30秒速读
IN SHORT: This paper solves the core problem of proving the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in finite-duration SI epidemic games, showing they are always bang-bang strategies.
核心创新
- Methodology Introduces a novel change of variables that simplifies the geometry and analysis of the SI social-distancing game, enabling explicit integration and closed-form solutions.
- Theory Proves that for the specified SI game with threshold-linear costs, the unique strategic equilibrium is always a time-dependent bang-bang strategy (wait-then-lockdown), with no singular solutions.
- Theory Demonstrates that in the restricted strategy space of two-phase (off-on) strategies, the bang-bang Nash equilibrium is also an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS), and that it coincides with the socially optimal policy, eliminating free-riding.
主要结论
- For all parameter tuples (m, I0, tf), there exists one and only one equilibrium point x* (Theorem 10), proving uniqueness in the SI game.
- The equilibrium strategy is explicitly given by x*(m, I0, tf) = m - 1 - W((1/I0 - 1)e^{m-1-tf}) for intermediate parameters, utilizing the Lambert W function (Eq. 13).
- The optimal public policy (minimizing population disutility ℰ(x̄)) exactly corresponds with the individual Nash equilibrium strategy (Eq. 18), showing no conflict between individual and social optima in this model.
摘要: The mathematical characterization of social-distancing games in classical epidemic theory remains an important question, for their applications to both infectious-disease theory and memetic theory. We consider a special case of the dynamic finite-duration SI social-distancing game where payoffs are accounted using Markov decision theory with zero-discounting, while distancing is constrained by threshold-linear running-costs, and the running-cost of perfect-distancing is finite. In this special case, we are able construct strategic equilibria satisfying the Nash best-response condition explicitly by integration. Our constructions are obtained using a new change of variables which simplifies the geometry and analysis. As it turns out, there are no singular solutions, and a time-dependent bang-bang strategy consisting of a wait-and-see phase followed by a lock-down phase is always the unique strategic equilibrium. We also show that in a restricted strategy space the bang-bang Nash equilibrium is an ESS, and that the optimal public policy exactly corresponds with the equilibrium strategy.