Paper List
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Evolutionarily Stable Stackelberg Equilibrium
通过要求追随者策略对突变入侵具有鲁棒性，弥合了斯塔克尔伯格领导力模型与演化稳定性之间的鸿沟。
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Recovering Sparse Neural Connectivity from Partial Measurements: A Covariance-Based Approach with Granger-Causality Refinement
通过跨多个实验会话累积协方差统计，实现从部分记录到完整神经连接性的重建。
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Atomic Trajectory Modeling with State Space Models for Biomolecular Dynamics
ATMOS通过提供一个基于SSM的高效框架，用于生物分子的原子级轨迹生成，弥合了计算昂贵的MD模拟与时间受限的深度生成模型之间的差距。
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Slow evolution towards generalism in a model of variable dietary range
通过证明是种群统计噪声（而非确定性动力学）驱动了模式形成和泛化食性的演化，解决了间接竞争下物种形成的悖论。
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Grounded Multimodal Retrieval-Augmented Drafting of Radiology Impressions Using Case-Based Similarity Search
通过将印象草稿基于检索到的历史病例，并采用明确引用和基于置信度的拒绝机制，解决放射学报告生成中的幻觉问题。
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Unified Policy–Value Decomposition for Rapid Adaptation
通过双线性分解在策略和价值函数之间共享低维目标嵌入，实现对新颖任务的零样本适应。
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Mathematical Modeling of Cancer–Bacterial Therapy: Analysis and Numerical Simulation via Physics-Informed Neural Networks
提供了一个严格的、无网格的PINN框架，用于模拟和分析细菌癌症疗法中复杂的、空间异质的相互作用。
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Sample-Efficient Adaptation of Drug-Response Models to Patient Tumors under Strong Biological Domain Shift
通过从无标记分子谱中学习可迁移表征，利用最少的临床数据实现患者药物反应的有效预测。
Evolutionarily Stable Stackelberg Equilibrium
Ganzfried Research
30-Second Overview
IN SHORT: Bridges the gap between Stackelberg leadership models and evolutionary stability by requiring follower strategies to be robust against mutant invasions.
Key Novelties
- Methodology Introduces the first formal integration of Stackelberg equilibrium with evolutionary stability, creating the SESS concept.
- Methodology Develops computational algorithms for both discrete normal-form games and continuous-trait games, enabling practical application.
- Biology Provides a natural framework for modeling asymmetric interactions in biological systems, such as physician-cancer cell dynamics in treatment optimization.
Conclusions
- The SESS framework successfully refines Stackelberg equilibrium by restricting follower responses to evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS), ensuring robustness against mutant invasions.
- Computational complexity analysis indicates that determining ESS existence is Σ₂ᴾ-complete, significantly harder than computing Nash equilibrium, highlighting the added value of stability guarantees.
- The model provides a direct and natural application to cancer treatment optimization, where the physician (leader) optimizes treatment against a population of cancer cell phenotypes (followers) that evolve stably.
Abstract: We present a new solution concept called evolutionarily stable Stackelberg equilibrium (SESS). We study the Stackelberg evolutionary game setting in which there is a single leading player and a symmetric population of followers. The leader selects an optimal mixed strategy, anticipating that the follower population plays an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the induced subgame and may satisfy additional ecological conditions. We consider both leader-optimal and follower-optimal selection among ESSs, which arise as special cases of our framework. Prior approaches to Stackelberg evolutionary games either define the follower response via evolutionary dynamics or assume rational best-response behavior, without explicitly enforcing stability against invasion by mutations. We present algorithms for computing SESS in discrete and continuous games, and validate the latter empirically. Our model applies naturally to biological settings; for example, in cancer treatment the leader represents the physician and the followers correspond to competing cancer cell phenotypes.